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Book Review
Toward a Feminist Orthodoxy
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State.
Harvard University Press. 330 pp. $25.00.
Peter Berkowitz
In the spring of 1989 Yale Law School students published the first
issue of the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism. The cover featured a
boldly revised drawing of Justitia, traditional symbol of justice. Still
garbed in a simple robe and holding aloft the scales of justice, the new
Justitia had lifted the blindfold thought to ensure her impartiality in
weighing and measuring grievances and meting out justice. One of the
Journal's short introductory manifestos explained that impartial adjudi-
cation was essentially unjust and no longer tolerable. Impartiality guar-
anteed blindness to systemic disadvantage, reflected bias in favor of the
powerful and affluent, and served to maintain a male-created status quo.'
Justice would be best served by restoring to Justitia her sight enabling
her to use "all her powers in overseeing the law." 2
The vision of a wise and good ruler distributing justice intelligently
and artfully to fit the needs of each individual soul is an ancient dream,
and the essential imperfectibility of the rule of law an ancient insight.
1. Wener, Dis-Covering Our Cover, I YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1. (1989).
2. Id., at 2.
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The feminist conviction that justice demands the transformation of the
judge into a philosopher-queen thus reflects as it adapts a venerable form
of political idealism, and for this reason alone, to say nothing of other
important considerations, the claims of feminism command the attention
of all friends of justice. Yet idealism can be a harsh taskmaster. To take
an extreme example, when Plato's Socrates depicted a city constructed in
strict accordance with justice he was compelled to imagine the remaking
of social life, as it were, from the ground up, including the abolition of
the family and the elimination of private property. What would Justitia,
conceived in feminist terms, see if she were to remove her blindfold?
What reforms would Justitia, freed from the constraints of impartiality
and viewing social and political life from a feminist standpoint, institute?
Many believe that feminism is an umbrella term covering a rich variety
of contestable histories and theories about women's customary roles and
traditional legal disabilities, exemptions, and entitlements, as well as con-
flicting views about the meaning of gender equality and government's
role in ending sex discrimination, and hence that it is misleading to speak
simply of a feminist standpoint. Not so according to Catharine MacKin-
non, Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School, an
activist and prominent legal academic, who asserts in her celebrated new
book, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, that feminism rightly
understood is radical or unmodified feminism.3 And what justice, unen-
cumbered by conventional constraints, would see from MacKinnon's
standpoint is a nightmare world ruled by a "male supremacist struc-
ture"4 at once everywhere and nowhere, shrewd and brutal, invisible and
all-encompassing.5 Though MacKinnon speculates that this male view-
point is universal and transhistorically enduring6 she is almost exclu-
sively preoccupied with exposing the colossal injustice she believes men
promulgate against women under the cover of American liberal democ-
racy. And lest one think that such chilling reforms as Socrates proposed
are the irrelevant fantasies of ancient philosophers, MacKinnon, like Soc-
rates, finds the family and private property, at least under the prevailing
3. C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINis'r THEORY OF THE STATE 117 (1989) [hereafter cited
by page number only]. Related to MacKinnon's thesis that feminism is radical feminism is her belief
that what unites women as women is more basic than bonds of race, ethnicity, shared values and a
common way of life, or religious belief and practice. Indeed, MacKinnon seems to believe that what
unites all women as women is more basic than what men and women share as human beings. This
basic substratum, according to MacKinnon, comprises inequality, powerlessness, subjugation, and
victimization. pp. 37, 116, 120.
4. p. 119. For additional examples of this usage see pp. 36, 51, 104, 115, 137, 151,172, 180, 238.
Is MacKinnon's aim to suggest that women's current legal, social, and political status is in
fundamental respects like that of blacks under white supremacist systems such as black chattel
slavery, Jim Crow laws, or the regime of apartheid in South Africa? If this is her intention, it is
incumbent upon MacKinnon, particularly in regard to so grave a charge, to move beyond lurid
insinuation and undertake some comparative study.
5. pp. 94, 119, 125, 170.
6. pp. 94, 105.
[Vol. 3: 389
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conditions of male supremacy, repugnant to justice. What for Socrates,
however, was part of a thought experiment designed to shed light on
whether justice is choiceworthy for its own sake sometimes seems to be
for MacKinnon the core of a potentially revolutionary project of funda-
mental social transformation.7
Nonetheless, and despite MacKinnon's extensive experience as an
activist and advocate, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State is short not
only on concrete proposals for reform, but admittedly lacks a positive
feminist theory of the state' and feminist account of adjudication.9
MacKinnon's book is "toward" a feminist theory of the state in the sense
that demolishing an old apartment building is "toward" the construction
of a new townhouse-for which no funds have been allocated and no
blueprints commissioned. It is not to be expected, MacKinnon explains,
that women who as a class have been systematically debased by the lib-
eral state and deprived of material, intellectual, and spiritual resources
should be equipped to elaborate a feminist theory of justice or the state.
Though MacKinnon mocks the practice of placing women on pedestals
as nothing more than a sly tactic for maintaining male supremacy,
MacKinnon herself engages in a form of pedestalization, for she seems to
appeal to the victim or inferior status she ascribes to women to establish
a special exemption for feminists, herself in particular, from living up to
the professed aspiration to advance a positive theory of the state.
MacKinnon's essay is an epic accusation' ° primarily levelled against
American liberal democracy (but by persistent innuendo implicating
human civilization from time immemorial) for sustaining "a reign of sex-
ual terror and abasement and silence and misrepresentation continuing
to the present day."" MacKinnon marshals considerable empirical evi-
dence and excoriates existing legal doctrine in an attempt to establish
that sex discrimination is endemic to the organization, preservation, and
reproduction of the liberal state. Her argument, driven by a high sense of
purpose and fierce moral indignation, crackles with outrage as she relent-
lessly seeks to expose the mechanisms by which the protection of individ-
ual rights necessarily results in the subjugation of women as a class.
Since distinguishing liberty from license, or determining the elusive line
beyond which the exercise of my freedom impermissibly infringes upon
your protected liberties is a traditional liberal dilemma, one which has
preoccupied thoughtful liberals and served as point of attack for con-
servative as well as Marxist critics of liberalism, MacKinnon's epic accu-
sation builds upon a widely recognized weakness of liberalism. It also
7. pp. 6, 11.
8. p. 157.
9. p. 159.
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speaks to a sense of justice, fair play, and concern for the disadvantaged
cultivated by many liberals.
MacKinnon's accusation consists of three major parts. The first,
"Marxism and Feminism," takes as its point of departure the Marxist
thesis that relations of economic production constitute and permeate cul-
ture, politics, and religious practice and belief and proceeds to criticize
Marxist and liberal feminist understandings of sex inequality, striving to
rid each of the vestiges of liberalism within. Rejecting the substance of
Marx's extraordinary reductivism, but retaining its form, MacKinnon
asserts that more fundamental than economic relations are the sexual
relations which underlie "the totality of social relations," 2 and seeks
with this new key to unlock the mysteries of social and political life rang-
ing from the basic structure of government to the intimacies of romantic
love, marriage and motherhood. The second part of MacKinnon's accu-
sation, entitled "Method," expounds the "way of knowing"-"con-
sciousness raising"-which enables feminism to lift the veil on relations
between the sexes and see them as they really are: brute relations of
power. The third part, appearing under the general rubric, "The State,"
aims to show how constitutional adjudication in general and legal doc-
trine governing rape, abortion, pornography, and sex inequality in partic-
ular reinforce the pervasive subjugation of women. As MacKinnon
herself acknowledges, 3 accusations or indictments presuppose laws,
rules of right conduct, or standards of justice. To what vision of justice
does MacKinnon appeal?
Initially, MacKinnon expressly disavows the intention and responsi-
bility of dealing with this fundamental question. Surprisingly, since her
book explores the social construction of gender and self, 4 a process
which MacKinnon emphasizes is weighted with moral and political sig-
nificance, MacKinnon invokes a distinction familiar to students of posi-
tivist social science, stressing that her book is "not a moral tract. It is
not about right and wrong or what I think is good and bad to think or to
do. It is a book about what is, the meaning of what is, and the way what
is, is enforced."' 5 Accordingly, MacKinnon announces that her novel
theoretical argument "does not advance an ideal (sex equality is taken, at
least nominally, as an agreed-upon social ideal) or a blueprint for the
future."' 6 Yet those who adhere less rigorously to the blue-chip distinc-
tion between facts and values MacKinnon momentarily endorses, and
have a keener interest in the sociology of knowledge than MacKinnon
here evinces will undoubtedly be stirred to wonder how it came to be that
12. p. 3.
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sex equality, even nominally-and dispute over the government's role in
combatting sex discrimination notwithstanding-has won widespread
support across the political spectrum. Since MacKinnon defiantly
declares that her book eschews the constraints of "academic literatures
or trends or discourses," and instead relies on "works that are useful" 7
the question arises: what use or interest does it serve for MacKinnon to
refrain entirely from examining her own important observation that sex
equality is a pervasive social ideal in the liberal state?
Much like Descartes, who helped establish the foundations for modern
philosophy, MacKinnon introduces new rules of right method for under-
standing human affairs. Consciousness raising, MacKinnon announces,
is the feminist method of knowing. 8 This new method of right know-
ing19 involves the formation of small, supportive groups of women meet-
ing to discuss their common experiences. MacKinnon's disclaimer
notwithstanding,20 it would be a mistake to conceive of consciousness
raising, as MacKinnon presents it, as a group exploration of richly com-
plicated and conflicting ways of experiencing and understanding
women's lives. This is because regardless of the feelings, memories, inju-
ries, desires, and hopes that women bring to consciousness raising,
MacKinnon lays down an apparently binding interpretation of women's
experience, namely, "the substantive principle governing the authentic
politics of women's personal lives is pervasive powerlessness to men,
expressed and reconstituted daily as sexuality."'"
Unlike conventional versions of philosophical, scientific or judicial
method which aim to formulate neutral, independent procedures, the
observance of which is thought to guarantee the validity of the results,
consciousness raising as interpreted and used by MacKinnon seems to be
designed to provide a forum for showcasing an independently established
and authoritative truth about women's pervasive subjugation to men.
Like some forms of psychoanalysis, MacKinnon's version of conscious-
ness raising presupposes a reality unmasked in the light of which it
17. pp. xiv, xv.
18. p. 84. The focus on method is characteristically modem. Consider some of MacKinnon's
distinguished recent predecessors in the attempt to enhance knowledge by innovating in regard to
method. Marx introduces the method of historical materialism. See e.g., K. MARX, The German
Ideology: Part I, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER (R. Tucker ed. 1978). Nietzsche inaugurates
genealogy. See F. NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS (W. Kaufmann trans. 1968).
Heidegger proclaims the unique advantages of phenomenological method. See M. HEIDEGGER,
BEING AND :TIME Introduction, pt. 7 (J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson trans. 1962). MacKinnon's
ambition to innovate in regard to method is at home in a long, immensely influential tradition.
MacKinnon's silence about rival critics of positivism and liberal legalism makes it difficult to
determine whether and in what respects consciousness raising marks an advance as a method of
knowing.
19. p. 106.
20. pp. 115, 116.
21. p. 120; see also pp. 37, 116.
1991]
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endeavors to impel participants to reinterpret their experience. One can
fully accept the truth of the stories of frustration, despair, and cruel
abuse women tell in consciousness-raising groups and still wonder
whether MacKinnon's consciousness raising produces "one horror story
after another,"22 because it systematically excludes the voices of women
who find a measure of contentment in the precarious, embattled institu-
tion of marriage and, along with hardship, pleasure amid the tangled
responsibilities of motherhood. What, for example, does MacKinnon's
consciousness raising imply for women such as Blu Greenberg, by her
own lights a feminist and Orthodox Jewish wife and mother, whose On
Women and Judaism: A View from Tradition23 describes her struggle to
respect and preserve the wisdom, beauty, and joy she experiences in her
traditional Jewish role while embracing the challenges of feminism and
striving to face up to the questionable ways in which traditional Judaism
has excluded women from positions of power? And doesn't MacKin-
non's "substantive principle" make Janie Crawford's first kiss across the
gatepost, like her mature love for Tea Cake, seem, in Nanny's words,
"like a manure pile after a rain"?24 Can MacKinnon recognize the valid-
ity of consciousness raising as a "method of knowing" if it does not issue
in agreement about MacKinnon's orthodoxy regarding the pervasive
powerlessness of women, the unremitting bleakness of their lives, and the
monstrous evils of liberalism? It is revealing that MacKinnon scarcely
even acknowledges the possibility that consciousness raising, correctly
conducted, produces anything but horror stories.
The sole rival to consciousness raising as a method of knowing which
MacKinnon recognizes is "scientific epistemology." And scientific epis-
temology, defined by MacKinnon as the quest for neutral, objective and
perspective free knowledge is, MacKinnon believes, the distinctively
male viewpoint.25 Or does she? Early on MacKinnon invoked the dis-
tinction between what is, and what is right and wrong,26 that is the good
old fashioned, garden variety positivism widely thought to underlie the
scientific outlook, to define the approach her book takes and excuse her
reluctance to explore the rise to prominence of sex equality as a well-
accepted social ideal. MacKinnon now proceeds to explain that rigid
adherence to the norm of objectivity characterizes the method of the
22. p. 92.
23. See generally B. GREENBERG, ON WOMEN AND JUDAISM: A VIEW FROM TRADITION
(1981).
24. Z. HURSTON, THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GOD 12 (1937).
25. "Aperspectivity is revealed as a strategy of male hegemony ..
"... The male epistemological stance, which corresponds to the world it creates, is objectivity: the
ostensibly noninvolved stance, the view from a distance and from no particular perspective,
apparently transparent to its reality .... What is objectively known corresponds to the world and can
be verified by being pointed to (as science does) because the world itself is controlled from the same
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social sciences and the physical sciences.27 Drawing upon the authority
of men such as Richard Rorty and Karl Popper, MacKinnon further-
more finds the norm of objectivity at the root of the state and liberal
legalism.28 The norm of objectivity in all its diverse manifestations,
MacKinnon declares, essentially serves to maintain and extend male
domination of women.29
Few today would deny that the unqualified quest for scientific objectiv-
ity, whether in the social sciences or in liberal legalism, has a powerful
tendency to distort the human conduct it purports to explain or adjudi-
cate.30 How then does MacKinnon establish the hegemonic and ruthless
reign of the ideal of scientific objectivity in jurisprudence and the study of
society and politics? First, she finds it useful to write as if the debates
that have raged within Anglo-American social science over the last thirty
years about the severe limitations on the scientific study of politics (in the
work of men and women such as L. Strauss, A. MacIntyre, C. Taylor
and H. Arendt, among others) have never happened. Moreover, MacK-
innon finds it expedient to ignore such classic reflections on the irrepara-
ble defects of scientific knowledge as Weber's melancholy meditation on
the incapacity of scientific knowledge to yield insight about right and
wrong, a" Pascal's famous reflections on the tension between the spirit of
geometry and the spirit of finesse, 2 and Plato's enduring preoccupation
with the "old quarrel between philosophy and poetry."33
Second, MacKinnon falsely implies that Langdell's aspiration to create
a science of the law modelled on geometry has defined the American
legal mind since the 1870s.34 MacKinnon, good to her word that her
argument "uses books that are useful"3" entirely omits to mention the
inconvenient and voluminous articles, studies, treatises and cases that
document the rise of sociological jurisprudence and legal realism, vastly
influential episodes in the history of the American legal academy mark-
ing the revolt against Langdell's impoverished legal formalism. This
revolt, almost as old as the Langdellian orthodoxy it successfully discred-
ited and associated with such legendary names as Pound, Holmes, Car-
dozo, Frank, Llewellyn, and Arnold, challenged the idea of the judge as a
neutral observer, insisted that experience, not logic, was the life of the
27. p. 97.
28. pp. 107 n.2, 162, 163.
29. p. 162.
30. More than twenty five years ago Judith Shklar argued that liberal legalism was a form of
political ideology - worth understanding properly and defending intelligently. See generally J.
SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964).
31. See M. Weber, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 129-
156 (H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills trans. and eds. 1946).
32. B. PASCAL, PENS tES, no.1 (L. Brunschvicg ed. 1897 & photo. reprint 1976).
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law, denied the law's autonomy, and sought to transform law into an
instrument for serving correct public policy as determined through study
of economics, political science, psychoanalysis, history and other disci-
plines. 36 Indeed, contrary to MacKinnon, Langdellianism, at least in the
pure or unmodified form MacKinnon attacks, has long been dead and
buried, and rare is the law student who fails to absorb the realist lessons
permeating the first year curriculum.
Third, MacKinnon sadly misrepresents recent constitutional history.
For example, MacKinnon asserts that under American constitutional
law, "those who have freedoms like equality, liberty, privacy, and speech
socially keep them legally, free of governmental intrusion. No one who
does not already have them socially is granted them legally. '" 37  It is
undeniably true that liberal democracies permit disparities in wealth and
social well being that, for the poor and disadvantaged, impair and even
cripple the effective exercise of political rights.31 Yet is that, as MacKin-
non implies, the whole story about American liberalism's promise of
equal liberty? What of the oft retold fifty year history of judicial activism
in the protection of "discrete and insular" minorities, 39 and the variety of
heightened standards of judicial review which have emerged in the fields
of due process, equal protection, and free exercise adjudication to scruti-
nize legislation dealing with vulnerable minority groups-including
women, who formally of course are not a minority-cut off from
majoritarian political processes or ill-equipped to exercise their political
rights?' Here MacKinnon falls strangely silent.
MacKinnon succeeds in reaffirming that "scientific epistemology" is a
grossly inadequate theoretical framework for understanding human
affairs. What she fails to show is that "scientific epistemology" is the sole
or even primary lens through which social scientists, jurists, and citizens
view themselves and the world.
MacKinnon pursues her attack on male supremacist ideology in dis-
cussions of rape, abortion, pornography, and sex discrimination. Though
MacKinnon's scathing indictment will awaken some from complacency
and galvanize others for productive political action, her theoretical
extremism combined with a stunning rhetorical power are, I believe, at
36. See generally L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986).
37. p. 163.
38. See Daniels, Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty, in READING RAWLS 253-83 (N.
Daniels ed. 1989).
39. For an instructive introduction to this important subject see Cover, The Origins of Judicial
Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L. J. 1287 (1982).
40. MacKinnon does allude to the judicial standard called "intermediate scrutiny," in order to
mock it as "a judicial standard of care for women only." p. 217. This is an application of the old
principle "damned if you do and damned if you don't." MacKinnon manages to denounce
constitutional law both for refusing to recognize that women have been disadvantaged as a class, and
for according women such recognition.
[Vol. 3: 389
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bottom profoundly counterproductive. To insist on understanding the
ordinary in terms of the extreme, indeed to hammer away relentlessly at
the distinction between the ordinary and the extreme, to efface the differ-
ences between homemakers and prostitutes, wives and concubines,
mothers and slaves more than runs the risk of levelling and homogeniz-
ing the variety of injuries women incur.41 It also sullies all pleasures
women experience as illusory, or worse, the irredeemably tainted gifts of
a corrupt status quo.
Consider rape. Since MacKinnon insinuates that under conditions of
sex inequality there is no fundamental difference between sex and rape42
and doubts whether women can meaningfully consent to sex,43 it is
unsurprising that she finds present rape law, which generally speaking
requires women alleging rape to show lack of consent, essentially unsatis-
factory. MacKinnon justly wonders how the law may determine what is
going on in a woman's mind.' Instead of concluding, along with the
criminal justice system, that the law must unfortunately resort to crude
external indications such as evidence of physical force or signs of resist-
ance to establish nonconsensual intercourse, MacKinnon insists that rape
ought to be determined from the perspective of the woman alleging a
crime. "Rape should be defined as sex by compulsion, of which physical
force is one form."45 Few would wish to quarrel with MacKinnon's view
that physical force is but one of the many and varied forms of compul-
sion. What insight does MacKinnon offer, however, in enabling jurors
and jurists to draw the fine discriminations between the forms of compul-
sion susceptible to legal action and the forms of compulsion beyond the
reach of law? When one interprets compulsion as broadly as MacKin-
non advocates, when one holds that social roles and legal structures are
gendered to the ground and work a massive and pervasive disadvantag-
ing of women, when one insists that relations between men and women
are fundamentally defined by unjust structures of domination and depen-
dence, then the very fact of intercourse seems to give rise to an all but
irrebuttable presumption of forced sex, or rape. Translated into legal
terms, this would seem to require shifting the burden of proof, compel-
ling a rape defendant who was shown to have had intercourse to prove
41. For example, comparing women's status in capitalist and socialist countries, MacKinnon
indidates that the latter do no better than the former in recognizing "the work that remains women's
distinctive service to men, regardless of the politics of those men: housework, prostitution, and other
sexual servicing, childbearing, childrearing." p. 10.
42. For example: "To know what is wrong with rape, know what is right about sex. If this, in
turn, proves difficult, the difficulty is as instructive as the difficulty men have in telling the difference
when women see one. Perhaps the wrong of rape has proved so difficult to define because the
unquestionable starting point has been that rape is defined as distinct from intercourse, while for
women it is difficult to distinguish the two under conditions of male dominance." p. 174.
43. For example: "If sex is normally something men do to women, the issue is less whether there
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the presence of consent in order to avoid conviction. MacKinnon, I
think, believes that a presumption of guilt ought to attach to defendants
in rape cases.
As MacKinnon advances an extremely expansive definition of rape she
blurs what is distinctively ugly and repellent in rape ordinarily under-
stood. And her theory subverts her facts. For example, MacKinnon
reports that "Almost half of all women. . .are raped or victims of
attempted rape at least once in their lives. Almost 40% are victims of
sexual abuse in childhood. '46 Ironically, MacKinnon's own ground-
that it is difficult for women to distinguish rape from intercourse under
conditions of male dominance47-tends to trivialize this appalling finding
as a drastic underestimation. And does not MacKinnon teach us to scoff
at social science results? Furthermore, it should be pointed out that
MacKinnon bases her numbers on an empirical study involving fewer
than a thousand women in San Francisco which specifically restricted its
statistical conclusions to San Francisco." In sum, by advancing, in dis-
regard of the cited study's carefully formulated conclusion, sweeping
generalizations about "all women" based on a small sample in a single
city MacKinnon needlessly squanders precious credibility; she deflects
attention away from odious crimes against women and onto her own
dubious methodological and rhetorical procedures.
MacKinnon subsequently undertakes to show that a woman's right to
abortion found in Roe v. Wade49 represents yet another surreptitious
measure by which men in the liberal state increase their power over
women. For MacKinnon the central meaning of Roe is an increase in
men's access to women's bodies, owing to a diminished fear of unwanted
children.5 ° The crux of the problem, according to MacKinnon, is that
Roe confers a right of privacy and thereby "reaffirms and reinforces what
the feminist critique of sexuality criticizes: the public/private split for the
lives of women."51 The distinction between public and private, which
MacKinnon with some justice believes to be at the heart of liberalism, is
pernicious on MacKinnon's account, because "[w]omen share isolation
in the home and degradation in intimacy." 52 MacKinnon glosses over
the unfortunate fact that degradation in the home comes in many forms,
46. p. 176, n. 19.
47. p. 174.
48. p. 174, n. 19 citing Russell and Howe, The Prevalence of Rape in the United States Revisited,
8 SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 668-695. Russell and Howell emphasize
that while their numbers apply only to San Francisco, their findings do support the general thesis
that "sexual violence against women is part of the everyday fabric of American life." Russell and
Howell, p. 695.
49. 410 U. S. 113 (1973).
50. "The abortion right frames the ways men arrange among themselves to control the
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from violent physical abuse to the quiet contempt born of familiarity and
fatigue. Should all forms of degradation become subject to judicial over-
sight? Sometimes MacKinnon writes as if the general commitment to
protect privacy or intimacy-never, contrary to MacKinnon, as a matter
of law or fact-is the root of the problem: "When the law of privacy
restricts intrusions into intimacy, it bars changes in control over that inti-
macy through law." 3 Regardless of whether some flesh and blood
women believed that they enjoyed increased personal freedom thanks to
the right to privacy found in Roe, from MacKinnon's perspective Roe,
because it relies upon and perpetuates a distinction between spheres of
legitimate and illegitimate state involvement, sets up one more obstacle
to harnessing the force of law for the task of remaking intimate personal
relations.
Just as the premise that intercourse is indistinguishable from rape
underlies MacKinnon's attack on the law of rape and animates her criti-
cism of the constitutional right to abortion, so too it serves as the point of
departure for her analysis of pornography. MacKinnon's charge that the
pornography industry regularly abducts, beats, and violently compels
women to work as porn models describes outrageous crimes. Why these
reprehensible acts cannot be combatted within the prevailing liberal
framework by better education, more effective precautions and more
thorough preventative measure, and a more determined, vigorous, and
vigilant law enforcement MacKinnon does not clearly say. MacKinnon's
argument that the consumption of pornography reinforces degrading ste-
reotypes about women is shared by many who would dispute MacKin-
non's conclusion that the proper response is to impose a far-reaching
ban. MacKinnon's original contribution to the debate over pornography
lies in her assertion that far from being a deviant genre in the liberal
state, "pornography is the essence of a sexist social order, its quintessen-
tial social act."54 MacKinnon affirms, as a simple, unadulterated truth,
that pornography "is not a distortion, reflection, projection, expression,
fantasy, representation, or symbol either. It is sexual reality."" Of
course, if sex is pornography, then banning pornography, as MacKinnon
expressly advocates, would seem to entail, at least under the prevailing
conditions of male dominance, the criminalization of sexual intercourse.
MacKinnon fervently believes that state power ought to be directed to
eradicating the pervasive sex inequality which "defines and situates
women as women."56 Remarkably, and despite her insistence on the
force of Marxist analysis, MacKinnon never identifies the material (or
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And inasmuch as MacKinnon contends that morality is a socially con-
structed web of meaning designed to maintain male supremacy, and
proudly boasts that the one true form of feminism, her radical femi-
nism,57 relinquishes "all instinctual, natural, transcendental, and divine
authority",58 it is a mystery why men ought to cooperate in the disman-
tling of their far-flung empire. How, one wonders, in MacKinnon's black
and white universe, rigidly segregated into victims and villains, peopled
with battered women and faceless men made of straw, and dominated by
a legal system that is a fatally twisted tool of male power,59 did sex equal-
ity ever emerge as MacKinnon suggests it has," even nominally, as a
standard of justice?
While MacKinnon acknowledges that "[o]n the level of the state, legal
guarantees of equality in liberal regimes provide an opening" for fighting
sex inequality, she treats this fact as an inexplicable aberration. 61 There
is excellent reason for MacKinnon to expressly refuse to explore this con-
spicuous feature of our political landscape. When one ponders, for
example, the significance of the Biblical teaching that God made male
and female in His image,62 or to turn to a very different and vastly less
pious quarter, Hobbes' early liberal view that equality based on like vul-
nerability to violent death outweighed any forms of human inequality, or
the later Kantian notion of a noumenal self entitled to respect and dig-
nity irrespective of empirical determinations (including gender), the
opinions about social justice underlying the rise of the welfare state, the
civil rights movement and the Warren Court's elaboration of due process
and equal protection guarantees, indeed MacKinnon's own dramatic suc-
cess over the past decade in helping establish sexual harassment as an
actionable offense, and a host of other practices, beliefs, and fundamental
teachings, it becomes evident that the ideal of equality has a long history
and deep roots in our religious, philosophical, and political traditions.6 a
To realize that MacKinnon's argument derives much of its force from an
appeal to a sense of justice powerfully inculcated (though, needless to
say, all too often unrealized to an excruciating degree) by a multifaceted
tradition she persistently caricatures, and to grasp that her theory is fun-
damentally dependent upon an extraordinarily rich cultural inheritance
which she tirelessly and tediously denounces is to perceive the spirited





61. pp. 242, 244.
62. Genesis 1:27.
63. Charles Taylor, in his remarkable study of the making of the modern identity, massively
documents the rise to prominence of the principle of equality or universal respect as axiomatic for
the modern mind. See C. TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
IDENTITY (1989), particularly at 8-11.
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Yet the genuine challenge MacKinnon poses does not end here. Espe-
cially one who wishes to heed the claims of justice is compelled to go
beyond MacKinnon's flawed theorizing and rhetorical excesses and listen
to her angry, impassioned, sometimes eloquent, and deliberately jarring
insistence that in myriad ways women, as a class, suffer wrongs invisible
to the law. Where bruised bodies and wounded spirits are at stake the
formulation and criticism of theory ought, for more than a moment, to
be moved to the sideline. MacKinnon compels us to confront afresh and
along a volatile dimension the discrepancy between the promise of the
liberal state and the often harsh reality. Because the law in the liberal
state (and not only in the liberal state) is an imprecise, cumbersome
instrument, rape is often likely to go undetected and unpunished; the
protection of privacy, reinforced by Roe, too easily creates shelter for
license and cruelty; the prosperous pornography industry reveals a
frightening side of our political and sexual life. Stifling customs and
practices which degrade women, stretching from the family to the mar-
ketplace, are within the ken (and should be a central concern) of defend-
ers of the family and proponents of limited government. Because
MacKinnon turns a blind eye to the precarious achievements of liberal
constitutionalism, one is not entitled to turn a deaf ear to the anguished,
easily muffled cry of the injured and the oppressed.
Still, these observations and the demands for prompt and sustained
action to which they give rise do not change the fact that MacKinnon's
popular slogan - "the personal is the political" -carries with it the
practical mandate for state supervision of conscience and thought in
order to wipe the slate clean and effect a radical revision of social rela-
tions starting with sexual relations. MacKinnon flatters herself in sup-
posing the originality of radical feminism's repudiation of the distinction
between the public realm and private life."4 In order to give credit where
credit is due, it is necessary to restate the hard truth that in this century
it was not MacKinnon's feminism unmodified, but rather the theorists of
European fascism who spearheaded the assault on the notion of pro-
tected liberties or a private sphere generally speaking off-limits to govern-
ment supervision.65
64. pp. 120-121, 191.
65. See Holmes, The Permanent Structure of Antiliberal Thought, in LIBERALISM AND THE
MORAL LIFE (N. Rosenbaum ed. 1989). Nor is MacKinnon the first to attack the alleged pernicious
moral and political implications of the distinction between subject and object. In his 1946 "Letter on
Humanism" Heidegger blames the forgetfulness of being on a grievous division between the public
realm and private existence which in turn arises out of an erroneous metaphysical distinction
between subject and object. See M. HEIDEGGER, Letter on Humanism, in BASIC WRITINGS, (D.
Krell ed. 1977). Before Heidegger, Nietzsche asserted that the distinction between subject and object
is a seduction of language; however, this seduction is, on Nietzsche's view, devised by the weak to
confound and ensnare the strong. See Nietzsche, supra note 18, pt. 1, § 13. Perhaps this fascinating
and as yet unexplored convergence of opinion about the evils inhering in the distinction between
subject and object can be explained by thinking of Heidegger and Nietzsche as proto-feminists.
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MacKinnon's feminism unmodified is fundamentalist in letter and
spirit. MacKinnon recognizes no respectable reasons for disagreeing
with her version of the facts or the moral and political implications she
draws from those facts. To assert as she does that feminism is radical
feminism66 and antifeminism is misogyny 67 is to transform dissent into
heresy or moral bankruptcy. A feminism unmodified by the freedom to
doubt, question, or qualify the article of faith that sex discrimination
reaches "down to the somatic level" 68 is a dogmatic feminism. Like
other secular faiths, MacKinnon's feminism unmodified displays a zeal-
ous intolerance of diversity, dissent and independence of mind.
Toward a Feminist Theory of the State is often mean-spirited and (by
self-proclaimed intention) a one-dimensional book. Worse, MacKinnon
has played into the hands of the smug, the indifferent, and the callous by
providing excellent reasons to dismiss her fervently argued contention
that men, aided and abetted by liberal democratic political institutions,
routinely and violently degrade women. It is ironic and regrettable that,
to the extent that MacKinnon is correct about the prevalence, depth, and
harm of sex discrimination, the indirect victims of her speculative
extremism, irresponsible scholarship, and contempt for "what is," are
the battered wives, the exploited porn models, the raped women, and the
sexually abused children whose plight is lost amid MacKinnon's polemi-
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